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THE RELATIONSHIP OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS

Every jurisdiction, either by legislation' or case law, 2 has
adopted the policy of awarding punitive or exemplary damages in
addition to compensatory damages to injured plaintiffs in certain
civil actions where the defendant's conduct warrants them. Thus,
if the trier of facts finds that the defendant has acted in such a way
as to justify the awarding of punitive damages, the plaintiff receives
an increased award. 3 This award, however, is in no manner an attempt to compensate the plaintiff for his injury.4 That function is
supposedly reserved to compensatory damages.'
Since punitive or exemplary damages are not intended to serve
as compensation to the plaintiff, most courts are inclined to feel that
the plaintiff has no "right" to the award of punitive damages,6.
and, consequently, approach the awarding of such damages with reluctance and caution.7 Many factors may be considered in the composition of an award of punitive damages. The standards vary depending upon the jurisdiction." As a result, the courts may judge
1. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1954); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 41-2-2 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2002 (1968).
2. See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 527 (1951); 22 AM. JuR. 2d
Damages §§ 263-66 (1965); 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 117-27 (1966).
3. While the courts are in agreement that punitive damages are to
be assessed where the defendant's conduct is wanton or malicious, it is
difficult to establish standards more concise than these since a determination that the defendant's conduct was wanton or malicious must of
necessity be limited to each particular set of facts.
4. Ark. Valley Alfalfa Mills v. Day, 128 Colo. 436, 263 P.2d 815
(1953).
5. State v. Shain, 341 Mo. 733, 108 S.W.2d 351 (1937).
6. See Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411
(1912); State v. Shain, 341 Mo. 733, 108 SW.2d 351 (1937); Pendleton v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 82 W. Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941 (1918) ("These damages
are not given as a matter of right."). But cf. Ferguson v. Evening
Chronicle Publishing Co., 72 Mo. App. 462 (1897) (the plaintiff had a
"clear legal right to actual or general damages as the jury might award
."); Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 276, 149 A.2d 648, 652 (1959) ("The
right to punitive damages is a mere incident to a cause of action- an
element which the jury may consider in making its determination.")
7. See cases cited in notes 21-49 and accompanying text infra.
8. It seems that no two courts are in complete agreement with regard to the factors to be considered in assessing a punitive damages
award. Some of these factors are: the age, size, strength and vigor of
ANN.

the parties; the relationship in which they stand to each other; the emo-

tions involved; the severity of the offense; the actual injury and damage
inflicted; the intent of the party committing the wrong; the financial ability of the parties; character of conduct involved; the potential damage

which might have been done by the wrongdoer's acts as well as the actual

the appropriateness of the amount awarded with a great deal of
subjectivity. This enables a court to advance its own particular attitudes towards the awarding of punitive damages without necessarily overruling prior cases, simply by juggling the necessary components of the award until the result desired is achieved."
Most of the jurisdictions are quick to advance the concept that
the jury, as the trier of facts, has a great deal of discretion in establishing the amount of punitive damages. 10 Yet, this untempered
discretion is actually very restricted. An appellate court may reverse or modify an award of damages by establishing that the jury,
as the trier of facts, abused its discretion." While the limitations
set upon the use of the discretion seem clear and apparent, the
court's application of them to affect a punitive damages award appears strained and at times inconsistent. 12 Although advancing the
concept that the function of punitive damages is to punish the
guilty defendant and to deter others from committing similar culpable acts,' 3 many courts have become tangled in semantics by attempting to relate the amount of punitive damages to be awarded
to the amount of compensatory damages to which the plaintiff is
entitled.14 Although this "test" would seem to simplify the court's
job in reviewing the question of excessive punitive damages awards,
it appears to have created more work. The courts are now burdened by the often awkward task of applying the test. 15 The
slightest misconception of a semantical nicety leads to a totally
unpredicted and irreconciliable result.' 6 A further disadvantage of
requiring a relationship between actual and punitive damages is
that the policies advanced by the courts of punishment and deterrence become nothing but best intentions.
damages; and generally all the circumstances attending the particular
transaction. See Wills v. Hughes, 172 Kan. 45, 238 P.2d 478 (1951); Allen
v. Ritter, 235 So. 2d 253 (Miss. 1970); Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d
685 (Mo. App. 1964); Hunter v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 213 Mo. App. 233,
248 S.W. 998 (1923); Cain v. Fontana, 423 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967);
Osterag v. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 1022 (1959); Malco Inc. v.
Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wisc. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516 (1961).
9. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1173 (1931).
10. See Gass v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 357 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1966);
Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952); Reynolds v. Pegler, 123
F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Horn v. Guar. Chevrolet Motors, 270 Cal.
App. 2d 477, 75 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1969); Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d
685 (Mo. App. 1964); Booth v. Kirk, 53 Tenn. App. 139, 381 S.W.2d 312
(1963). See generally 25 C.J.S. Damages § 117(2) (1966).
11. See note 99 and accompanying text infra.
12. See note 19 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 97-103 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 112-16 and accompanying text infra.
16. See Ennis v. Brawley, 129 W. Va. 621, 41 S.E.2d 680 (1947)
where the court had to review the history of the particular point of law in
the jurisdiction in order to show how the cases had often been miscited.
The court explained the miscitations by stating: "In an opinion the Beck
case and the Mayer case both contained loose statements that have given
rise to a large part of the partial confusion which exists in this jurisdiction." Id. at 628, 41 S.E.2d 684.
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This Comment will set forth and analyze the techniques and
approaches used by the courts in considering the relation which the
award of punitive damages must bear to actual damages. This
analysis will first consider the policy of some courts in stipulating
that the plaintiff is not entitled to any award of punitive damages
T
unless the trier of facts has also awarded compensatory damages.'
There will follow an analysis of the device employed by many
courts for testing the excessiveness of an award of punitive damages
by contrasting the punitive damages awarded with the amount of
actual damages awarded or shown."' It will be seen how many
courts use this highly subjective test to establish a relationship
which merely reflects their own particular point of view. 19 As a result, the trier of facts' function in ascertaining punitive damages
often becomes a meaningless act since the appellate courts' review
of such award often renders it a nullity because "it is of such
amount as to plainly manifest passion and prejudice, rather than
'20
reason or justice.
I.

THE POLICY OF PUNITIVE DAmAGES

Punitive damages are not intended to remunerate the injured party for the damages he may have sustained. They
are not to compensate; they are the penalty the law inflicts
for gross, wanton, and culpable negligence, and are allowed
as a warning or as an example to defendant or others. Because they are an example as to what the law will do for
such conduct when it results in injury to the person or
property of others, they are sometimes called exemplary
damages. 2 1

The function of punitive damages is twofold in most jurisdic22
tions: to punish the defendant for malicious or wanton conduct,
17. See notes 43-96 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 97-119 and accompanying text infra.
19. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV.
1173, 1180 (1931):
This test is probably more a rationalization of results than a means
of obtaining them. The proper ratio between actual damages and
punitive damages is placed at a figure which supports the judge's
view of the verdict, formulated before the test is thought of.
See also Hughes v. Babcock, 349 Pa. 475, 37 A.2d 551 (1944).
20. Faubion v. Tucker, 58 N.M. 303, 270 P.2d 713 (1954).
21. Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 63, 274 P. 639, 642 (1929). See also
Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D.Colo. 1968).
22. Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo.
1968); Johnson Publishing Co., 271 Ala. 474, 124 So. 441 (1961); State v.
Shain, 341 Mo. App. 733, 108 S.W.2d 351 (1937); Booth v. Kirk, 53 Tenn.
App. 139, 381 S.W.2d 312 (1963); Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d
431 (1952). See generally 25 C.J.S. Damages § 117 (1966); 22 AM. JUR.
2d, Damages § 237 (1965).

and to deter similar conduct by others.2 3 Punitive damages are
assessed against the guilty defendant as a form of punishment for
culpable actions, 24 therefore, they must be high enough to actually
punish.25 The problem, however, is in determining at what level
the award ceases to be effective punishment and instead creates a
financial situation which is insufferable for the defendant and those
around him.2 6

In attempting to promote the punishment function

of punitive damages, courts do consider the wealth of the defendant
before ascertaining the amount of damages to be awarded. 21 This
is done so that the court, in determining the appropriate amount
to be awarded as punishment, may effectively serve this function. 25
An award of $500 punitive damages against a millionaire would be
trivial and punish very little, while to a man earning $6,000 a year
with a family to support, this may indeed be a "punishing" sum.
Conversely, assessing $20,000 punitive damages against a wealthy
man may well impress upon him a proper perspective concerning
the wisdom of his culpable conduct. Such a judgment against a
poorer man would not only punish, but bankrupt as well.
The problem is in determining the amount which will serve to
punish and the point at which increased damages will make the defendant destitute. As will be seen in later sections, however, this
question does not seem to be the driving force behind the appellate
court's revision of punitive damages awards. The courts seem not
at all disturbed by the effect of the awards upon the respective defendants. Their opinions appear more directed toward depriving
the plaintiff of the benefit of any punitive damages because he has
failed to experience a measure of injury which would warrant such
an award.2 9 Ignored is the primary stated function of punitive
23. See cases cited note 22 supra.
24. See cases cited note 22 supra.
25. See cases cited note 33 infra. See also Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo. 1968).
26. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HAnv. L. R~v.
1173 (1931).
27. See Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709 (Del. 1967); Jacksonville Frosted Foods, Inc. v. Haigler, 224 So. 2d 437 (Fla. App. 1969);
Hutchison v. Lott, 110 So. 2d 442 (Fla. App. 1959); Allen v. Ritter, 235
So. 2d 253 (Miss. 1970); Basden v. Mills, 472 P.2d 889 (Okla. 1970); Suzore
v. Rutherford, 35 Tenn. App. 678, 251 S.W.2d 129 (1952); Malco, Inc. v.
Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wisc. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516 (1961).
28. In Hutchison v. Lott, 110 So. 2d 442 (Fla. App. 1959), the court
took judicial notice of the defendant's salary in reviewing the punitive
damages award, reasoning that the amount of punitive damages awarded
should bear some relation to the amounts that the defendant is able to
pay. This is true because the pecuniary punishment to a man of large
means would not be the same as it would to a man of lesser means.
See also Pendleton v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 82 W. Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941
(1918).
29. See Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1896);
Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 354, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1970);
Ark. Valley Alfalfa Mills v. Day, 128 Colo. 436, 263 P.2d 815 (1953); King v.
Towns, 102 Ga. App. 895, 118 S.E.2d 121 (1960); Tynberg v. Cohen, 76
Tex. 416, 13 S.W. 315 (1890); Ennis v. Brawley, 129 W. Va. 621, 41 S.E.2d
680 (1947).
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damages which is to punish the defendant for the culpability of his
act.80
The second function of punitive damages is deterrence. They
are "intended as a warning and example to prevent the defendant
and others from the commission of like offenses and wrongs." 81
While the punitive damages awarded must be large enough to act as
an effective deterrent, they should not be any larger.-2
[I] f the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and
to act as a deterrent, a verdict which is not in such sum as
to make itself felt upon an offender defeats that purpose.
Unless it is of sufficient substance to "smart," the offender
in effect purchases a right to libel another for a price which
may have little or no effect upon him. Indeed, in such a
situation a defendant, instead of being deterred from a
repetition of his offense, may be encouraged to renew his
assault.33
The deterrent function is based on the same premise as penal
sanctions: that anti-social conduct can be restrained by the fear of
future sanctions. The problem with this rationale, the same as that
underlying the use of prison sentences or the death penalty, is determining to what extent the awarding of high punitive damages is
truly an effective deterrent. The public is at least aware of the imposition of penal sanctions. When the death penalty or a lengthy
prison sentence is imposed for criminal activity, the news media
gives sufficient coverage so the public is aware of the existence and
application of these sanctions. The same is not necessarily true of
an award of punitive damages in a civil suit. Although an occasional extraordinary award may be publicized because of great public interest, this is the exception rather than the rule. The only
way the imposition of punitive damages can be effective as a deterrent is if those people within the class of foreseeable defendants are
aware of the existence of such a sanction.
It would seem that in most jurisdictions, and especially in those
which allow the awarding of punitive damages even where a crimi30. One court, Hess v. Marinari, 81 W. Va. 500, 94 S.E. 968 (1918),
has even queried whether compensatory damages themselves aren't punishment; and if so, the punitive damages should be allowed only where
the award of actual damages is insufficient for the purpose of punishment.
Yet another court in Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 154 Conn.
116, 222 A.2d 220 (1966) has held that the punitive damages award
should be limited to the amount which would serve to compensate the
plaintiff to the extent of his expenses and litigation, less taxable costs.
31. See cases cited note 22 supra.
32. See Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948);
Flanary v. Wood, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 250, 73 S.W. 1072 (1903). See generally cases cited 22 AM. JUR. 2d, Damages §§ 263-64 (1965); 25 C.J.S.,
Damages §§ 117-18 (1966).
33. Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).

nal sanction arising out of the same misconduct exists, 3 4 punitive
damages are something in addition to a punishment or deterrent 5
As the United States Supreme Court has suggested, 36 punitive damages may be an inducement for those with small injuries to bring
actions for remuneration for their injuries.3 7 This becomes more
apparent in certain civil causes of action, such as libel, where the
actual damages sustained are usually trivial or unascertainable; yet
the plaintiff might receive a substantial award of punitive damages. 8 An action such as this, which in most cases involves an injury only to one party, would go unpunished if the injured party
did not bring suit. If the victim refused to sue, a malicious individual could go unrebuked because he had maliciously harmed a
person whose character and reputation were so well established
that he suffered negligible injury as a result of the defendant's conduct 9 Consequently, it is in the best interest of society to allow
34. See cases cited note 32 supra.
35. At least one court has put forth the idea that there may be occasions where the punishment function is better served through the criminal
law than the civil law. The court in Ennis v. Brawley, 129 W. Va. 621,
41 S.E.2d 680 (1947), a case involving an action for assault and battery
held that an award of only nominal compensatory damages would not support an award of punitive damages; reasoning that it was the function of
the criminal law, not the civil law, to render the punishment in those
circumstances where the plaintiff has suffered no injuries of any kind in
the eyes of the jury.
An obvious shortcoming of this line of reasoning is evidenced in Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo. 1968), a defamation action in which the ratio of the award of punitive damages to compensatory damages was four to one. In affirming the damages award as
determined by the lower court, the court concluded:
A defamation case presents somewhat different considerations than
the assault and battery type of case. There may be a good reason in this latter kind of case to maintain a reasonable proportion
between actual and exemplary damages. The assault and battery
usually results from an impulsive act on the part of the defendant,
and there is every reason to require that the punishment be
closely related to the magnitude of the harm inflicted. In defamation, however, the plaintiff might have a superior reputation not
susceptible to injury, or the defendant might have a very poor
reputation for truth and veracity. As a result there would be little
actual injury to the plaintiff. At the same time, the defendant
might have been actuated by malice of the worst kind. To require a low-proportion exemplary award in this type of case would
allow a malicious defendant to defame someone and escape without
punishment.
Id. at 372-73.
36. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 6 S. Ct. 110 (1885).
37. Id. at 114 ("The injury actually received is often so small that in
many cases no effort would be made by the sufferer to obtain redress if
the private interests were not supported by the imposition of punitive
damages.")
38. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 225 F. Supp. 916, 920
(N.D. Ga. 1964) (The jury awarded $60,000.00 actual and $3,000,000.00
punitive damages, but the trial judge remitted this sum to $400,000.00
punitive damages).
39. See Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1954):
To adopt the contrary view now urged by the defendants would
mean that a defamer gains a measure of immunity no matter how
venomous or malicious his attack simply because of the excellent
reputation of the defamed; it would mean that the defamer, motivated by actual malice, becomes the beneficiary of the unassailable
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plaintiffs who may have actually suffered only inconvenience or
minimal injury to receive awards of punitive damages sufficient to
punish the culpable defendant. 40 This is not to say that the plaintiff should be entitled to receive these damages without first proving an injury; but only to suggest that as between a malicious tortfeasor and an innocent victim, it is better that the latter receive a
windfall than the former go unpunished.
Just as many courts ignore the punishment function of punitive
damages, they also ignore their deterrent function. Any test which
requires a relationship between actual damages and punitive damages disregards the obvious fact that the amount of ascertainable
injury is no barometer of the degree of malice entertained by the
defendant. Even those tests which measure the excessiveness of
punitive damages by the particular facts of each case fail to promote
the true functions of punitive damages unless they consider the
defendant's mens rea. However, in some instances a court could
properly infer that the absence of proof of injury illustrates a lack
of malice. 41 Nevertheless the courts should consider the means
employed in reaching their decision as well as the results achieved. 42
II.

ACTUAL DAMAGES AS A PREDICATE TO PuNITVE DAMAGES

Fundamental to a discussion of the merits of a test requiring
a reasonable relationship between punitive and actual damages is
an analysis of the practice of most courts in requiring that the
plaintiff be first entitled to an award of compensatory damages before he may also receive punitive damages. 43 This practice is more
reputation and so escapes punishment. It would require punitive
damages to be determined in inverse ratio to the reputation of the
one defamed.
See also Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo.
1968).
40. See Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1896);
Ferraro v. Pacific Finance Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 354, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226
(1970); Tynberg v. Cohen, 76 Tex. 416, 13 S.W. 315 (1890); Ennis v. Brawley, 129 W. Va. 621, 41 S.E.2d 680 (1947).
41. See Stacey v. Portland Publishing Co., 68 Me. 287 (1878). Contra,
Ferguson v. Evening Chronicle Publishing Co., 72 Mo. App. 462 (1897).
See also cases cited note 30 supra which advocate the inclusion of the
compensatory damages award among the factors to be considered in reviewing the amount of punitive damages awarded by the lower court.
42. See Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo.
1968).
43. See, e.g., Ollier v. Lake Central Airlines, Inc., 423 F.2d 554 (6th
Cir. 1970) (applying Ohio law); Fischer Const. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 420 F.2d 271 (10th Cir. 1969) (applying Oklahoma law); PSG Co. v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 417 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1969)
(applying Oregon law); Dowling v. J.C. Penney Co., 300 F. Supp. 307
(W.D. Pa. 1969); Creme Lure Co. v. Schwartztrauber, 257 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.

complicated than it initially appears, since two issues are inherent
in this requirement of actual damages: (1) What amount of compensatory damages will support an award of punitive damages?
(2) Must the compensatory damages be actually awarded, or is it
sufficient that the plaintiff has shown that he actually suffered the
injuries?
Most courts, with few exceptions, 44 feel that since the plaintiff
has no legal right to punitive damages, he cannot maintain an
action for punitive damages without first showing a cause of action
for compensatory damages. 45 However, there is a split of authority
as to the amount of actual damages which need be proven. 46 Some
courts require only an award of nominal damages,47 while others
require proof of substantial damages, or at least something more
than nominal damages.

48

The courts which require only an award of nominal damages
consider the true function of nominal damages is not to make the
plaintiff whole from his injury, but merely to recognize the existence of some wrongful act by a culpable defendant.
Nominal damages are not given as an equivalent for wrong,
Iowa C.D. 1966); Suflas v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., 218 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.
Pa. 1963); LaFrentz v. Gallagher, 105 Ariz. 255, 462 p.2d 804 (1970); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 813, 440 S.W.2d 582
(1969); Stephenson v. Collins, 210 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1968); Haughabrook v.
Taylor, 225 Ga. 317, 168 S.E.2d 163 (1969); McDonald v. Bauman, 199 Kan.
628, 433 P.2d 437 (1967); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917
(1942); Allen v. Ritter, 235 So. 2d 253 (Miss. 1970); Ervin v. Coleman, 454
S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1970); Smith v. Krutar, 153 Mont. 325, 457 P.2d 459 (1969) ;
City of Reno v. Silver State Flying Service, Inc., 84 Nev. 170, 438 P.2d 257
(1968); O'Connor v. Harms, 111 N.J. Super. 22, 266 A.2d 605 (App. Div.
1970); Clemmons v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 274 N.C. 416, 163 S.E.2d 761 (1968);
Eaddy v. Greensboro-Fayetteville Bus Lines, 191 S.C. 538, 5 S.E.2d 281
(1939). Contra, Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196 (2d Cir. 1896);
Cherro v. Bank of Babylon, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114, 54 Misc. 2d 277 (Sup. Ct.
1967).
44. See cases cited note 6 and accompanying text supra.
45. See Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969).
See also cases cited note 43 supra.
46. See generally Annot. 17 A.L.R.2d 527 (1951); 22 AM. JUR. Damages § 265 (1965); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 118 (1966). See also Holliday v.
Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 256 F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1958); Hamerly v.
Denton, 359 P.2d 121 (Alaska 1961); Lundquist v. Marire Eng'rs. Beneficial Ass'n. No. 97, Inc., 208 Cal. App. 2d 390, 25 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1963);
Teich v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 40 Misc. 2d 519, 243 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup.
Ct. 1963); Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959).
47. See Foster v. Sikes, 202 Ga. 122, 42 S.E.2d 441 (1947); Louisville
& N.R. Co. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912); Heinze v. Murphy,
180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942); Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289
(Mo. 1970); O'Connor v. Harms, 111 N.J. Super. 22, 266 A.2d 605 (App.
Div. 1970); Clemmons v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 274 N.C. 416, 163 S.E.2d 761
(1968); Eaddy v. Greensboro-Fayetteville Bus Lines, 191 S.C. 538, 5 S.E.2d
281 (1939). But see, Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196 (2d Cir.
1866); Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup.
Ct. 1967).
48. See Lenske v. Knutson, 410 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1969) (applying
Oregon law); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Weider v. Hoffman, 238 F. Supp. 437 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Claude v. Weaver Constr. Co.,
261 Iowa 225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968).
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but merely in recognition of technical injury and by way of
declaring rights of plaintiff's and are damages in name only
and are assessed in some trifling or trivial amount selected
simply for the purpose of declaring an infraction
of plain49
tiff's rights and a commission of a wrong.
In certain causes of action, such as libel or trade infringement, actual damages suffered by the plaintiff are to a great extent unascertainable and difficult to calculate. To deny the plaintiff punitive
damages because of this problem in valuation is to further frustrate
the policy behind punitive damages.
Furthermore, while it may be conceded that the plaintiff has
no independent right to punitive damages without a cause of action
for compensatory damages, this is not the case where nominal damages are awarded. Where the jury has only awarded nominal damages, it has found that the defendant was culpable in his conduct. 0°
The fact that nominal damages were all that was awarded does not
necessarily dictate the conclusion that no other injuries were suffered by the plaintiff.5 1 It hardly seems consistent to allow the jury
to award punitive damages as punishment where the damages are
easily ascertainable; yet to deny the plaintiff's award of punitive
damages where the defendant has committed some malicious act
such as libel, where the law has established special provisions5 2 because the actual damages suffered are so difficult to ascertain. In
either case, the plaintiff is suing to redress a wrong. In either case,
there could be the same degree of malice. Yet, based solely on the
ability of the plaintiff to establish actual damages, the plaintiff is
denied punitive damages in one case and allowed them in the other.
In Ferguson v. Evening Chronicle Publishing Co., " the court
attacked the irrationality of denying the plaintiff punitive damages
where only nominal damages are awarded.5 4 It felt that the plaintiff had a "clear legal right" 55 to any actual damages and punitive
49. Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709, 711 (Del. 1967).
50. See Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709 (Del. 1967); Ferguson v. Evening
Chronicle Publishing Co., 72 Mo. App. 462 (1897); See also T. SEDWICK,
A

TREATISE

ON

THE

MEAsuRE

OF

DAMAGES

(8th

ed. 1891).

Contra.

Ennis v. Brawley, 129 W. Va. 621, 41 S.E.2d 680 (1947).
51. See Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. 2d 161, 217 P.2d 19 (1950).
52.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 569 (1938):

One who falsely, and without a privilege to do
matter defamatory to another in such a manner as
publication a libel is liable to the other although no
or loss of reputation results therefrom.
See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 570 (1938) ("Liability
Special Harm, When Imposed - Slander").
53. 72 Mo. App. 462 (1897).
54. Id. at 465-66.
55. Id. at 465.

so, publishes
to make the
special harm
Without Proof of

damages which the jury might award. The fact that the jury decided that punitive damages were more appropriate than substantial damages should not alter that right.
Having a clear legal right to actual or general damages and
such punitive damages as the jury might award, how can
it be logically said that because the jury only gave him one,
he must be deprived of that? Had the jury given him a
substantial amount as actual damages, and also awarded
punitive damages, the validity of their verdict would be beyond question under the facts showing that the publication was false, and under the law permitting a separate recovery for actual and punitive damages in cases of libel.
This being so, with what reason can the defendant complain
that the jury found against him for damages of the one kind
when they had the undoubted right to find against him for
both kinds?5 6
The court concluded that by denying punitive damages where only
nominal damages were awarded, the jury was defeating the very
function of punitive damages.
Appellant's theory that punitive damages are conditioned
upon a further finding of some substantial sum as actual
damages is occasioned by a misapprehension of the essence
and object of punitive damages. These are recoverable in
certain civil actions, not to compensate the plaintiff, but
solely to punish the defendant.
This legal motive would suffer defeat if punitive damages
could not be given for a malicious attack upon a reputation
too well established to receive substantial injury at the
hands of the libelor. Moreover, whenever there is an infracted legal right entitling a party to recover both kinds
of damages, there can be no reason depriving a jury of the
power to inflict punitive damages because compensating
damages were found by them to be only nominal. A verdict for nominal damages of itself established the full actionable right of the plaintiff, and as that right implies in
law permission to the jury to give punitive, as well as actual, damages, it is a mere logical sequence that a verdict for
nominal damages establishes the right of the plaintiff to a
verdict upon the issue of punitive damages. .... 57
The landmark case for those jurisdictions which require something more than nominal damages to support an award of punitive
damages is Stacey v. PortlandPublishing Co., 58 an action for libel.
The Stacey court expressed the attitude that since the jury had
only awarded $1.00 nominal damages, there was obviously no injury
done to the plaintiff. In that case, they reasoned, there was no reason to punish the defendant.
The legal signification of the verdict is either there was no
actual and express malice entertained toward the plaintiff
by defendant's agent, or that, if there was, it did the plain56.

Id.

58.

68 Me. 279 (1878).

57. Id.
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tiff no injury. There is no room for punitive damages here.
There is no foundation for them to attach to or rest upon.
It is said in vindication of the theory of punitive damages
that the interests of the individual injured and of society
are blended. Here the interests of society have virtually
nothing to blend with. If the individual has but a nominal
interest, society can have none. But if the individual injury is merely technical and theoretical, what is punishment to be inflicted for?5 9
The court reasoned that the function of punitive damages was
to punish the defendant for his wrongful act, and here since the
plaintiff could only prove nominal damages, society should fare no
better.
If a plaintiff upon all such elements of injury as were
open to him is entitled to recover but nominal damages,
shall he be the recipient of penalties awarded on account
of an injury or a supposed injury to others besides himself?
If there is enough in the defense to mitigate the damages
to the individual, so did it mitigate the damages to the public as well. Punitive damages are the last to be assessed in
the elements of injury to be considered by the jury and
should be the first to be rejected by facts in mitigation.
60

Finally, although acknowledging that this was not a hard and fast
rule, the court stated that punitive damages should not be awarded
when the plaintiff has merely proven nominal damages.
There may be cases, no doubt, where the actual damages
would be but small and the punitive damages large. But
this is not of such a kind. It would have been proper in
this case for the presiding justice to have informed the jury
that if the actual damages were nominal and no more, they
need not award punitive damages.6 1
There are other rationales put forth in support of the concept
expounded in Stacey. The West Virginia Supreme Court, in two
cases02 heard the same day, used two entirely distinct reasons to
deny the respective plaintiff's claims for punitive damages. In
63
Tober v. Cassinelli,
the court first laid down the principle that a
finding of actual damages is a necessary precondition to a finding of
59. Id. at 287-88.
60. Id. at 288.
61. Id. The court in Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9, 9 So.
375 (1891) directly questioned the soundness of the Stacey holding. The
Sellers court was of the opinion that Stacey ignored the true punishment
and deterrence functions of punitive damages.
62. Toler v. Cassinelli, 129 W. Va. 591, 41 S.E.2d 672 (1947); Ennis v.
Brawley, 129 W. Va. 621, 41 S.E.2d 680 (1947).
63. 129 W. Va. 591, 41 S.E.2d 672 (1947).

punitive damages.6 4 The court expressed the opinion that where
no compensatory damages were proven, an award of punitive damages may be taken as an indication that the jury was actuated by
passion, prejudice and improper motives. 65 The court then denied
the plaintiff punitive damages since no actual damages were
found. 66
Later that same day in Ennis v. Browley6 7 the court, when confronted with an award of nominal actual damages, used language
similar to that of Stacey in denying the plaintiff's award of punitive damages.
[I]f plaintiff suffered no injuries of any kind in the eyes of
the jury it is the function of the criminal law, not the civil
law, in the proper circumstances to inflict deserved punishment upon the defendant. A finding of nominal damages
means, in effect, that the defendant though guilty of wanton disregard of the rights of others, has done no injury.
However, a person who comes to court and obtains redress
of his personal grievances by way of substantial recovery
of actual damages-mental, physical, or otherwise-will be
permitted to mulct the defendant if he establishes that his
injuries were inflicted in wanton disregard of his rights, the
law thus recognizing a culpability approaching the criminal
that may exist in the commission of a tort and the propriety
of punishing it in a civil
action when it results in substan68
tial injury to another.
The court here has reasoned that the presence of little or no
injury is an indication of the defendant's lack of wanton or malicious conduct. This is not necessarily the case. As long as the
courts are willing to allow a recovery of punitive damages in those
situations where the defendant has acted maliciously or wantonly, if
only to punish the defendant for his culpable conduct, the amount
of injury actually suffered or provable is irrelevant. It is the defendant's state of mind which is to be punished. To infer a lack of
malice from an absence of injury is to frustrate the function and
goals of punitive damages. For example, a criminal assault has
been committed in some jurisdictions when the defendant has
merely attempted to intentionally harm the victim, regardless of
whether the victim is in fact harmed, and whether he is even aware
of being put in danger.6 9 There is another form of assault, recognized both criminally and civilly, which is committed when the
70
victim is merely placed in apprehension of a felonious touching.
Thus, the criminal law punishes the defendant not only for placing
the victim in fear of harm, but also for merely having the criminal
64. Id. at 601, 41 S.E.2d at 679.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 601-02, 41 S.E.2d at 679.
67. 129 W. Va. 621, 41 S.E.2d 680 (1947).
68. Id. at 625-26, 41 S.E.2d at 683.

69. See generally cases cited 6 C.J.S. Assault & Battery, §§ 1-27, 57-68
(1937); 6 Amv. JuR. 2d Assault & Battery §§ 1-36, 109-18 (1963).

70. Id.
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thought, regardless of the outcome. If the courts choose to maintain their contention that punitive damages are to serve as punishment, it is more consistent with this function to award punitive
damages if the defendant has acted wantonly and maliciously regardless of the injuries actually inflicted.
In addition, the court is not considering the difficulty in ascertaining or calculating damages which may result in certain causes of
action.7 1 The West Virginia Supreme Court could have followed
the rationale of Toler, decided the very same day as Ennis, which
held that an award of actual damages was a precondition to an
award of punitive damages. It would seem that if the Toler theory
held true where no damages were incurred, it would be just as valid
where only nominal damages were awarded. This failure to follow
the jurisprudence of prior decisions based on similar facts in many
ways epitomizes the patent inconsistency which besets the courts
when dealing with the issue of punitive damages. This would seem
to suggest that possibly the courts attempt to approach each set of
facts with an eye toward the results they wish to achieve, rather
than strictly applying the law objectively to the facts as proven. 72
Once the courts have determined the proper amount of actual
damages needed as a basis for an award of punitive damages, they
must then resolve the issue of whether or not the actual damages
need be actually awarded or merely shown.73 In many cases this
71. It is because of this problem that the courts have adopted certain
devices to aid in proving damages in causes of action such as libel and
slander. As was set forth in note 52 supra, the courts in specific areas of
the law where the opportunity for damage is so highly probable, yet the
possibility of proving these damages is slight, have provided the procedure
by which a plaintiff may allege damages per se. See Cromwell-Collier
Publishing Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1948); Press Publishing
Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196 (2d Cir. 1896); Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc.,
290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo. 1968); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d
709 (Del. 1967).
72. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173
(1931).
73. There are several approaches to this question. Some courts require only a showing that the plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages.
See, e.g., Topanga Corp. v. Gentile, 249 Cal. App. 2d 447, 58 Cal. Rptr. 713
(1967); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969);
McDonald v. Bauman, 199 Kan. 628, 433 P.2d 437 (1967); Smith v. Krutar,
153 Mont. 325, 457 P.2d 459 (1969); Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist., 20 Utah 2d 195, 436 P.2d 230 (1968).
Some states hold that
compensatory damages must be proven and awarded. See, e.g., Fischer
Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 271 (10th Cir. 1969)
(applying Oklahoma law); Durham v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 208 F.2d
342 (4th Cir.'1953) (applying Virginia law); Dowling v. J.C. Penney Co.,
300 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Daniel, 246 Ark. 813, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Smith v. Piper, 423 S.W.2d 22
(Mo. App. 1967); Nance v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 12 Utah 2d
233, 364 P.2d 1027 (1961).
Some states require proof of actual damages

question becomes complicated by the semantic gymnastics involved
in interpreting a court's rule of law on the issue. For example, in
Ft. Worth Elevator Co. v. Russell,7 4 the plaintiffs, survivors of a
decedent killed in an accident, received compensation under the
decedent's workman's compensation insurance. The plaintiffs then
brought this suit for exemplary damages. The court first stated
that the rule in Texas with regard to punitive damages was
that exemplary damages cannot be recovered unless the
plaintiff is shown to have sustained actual loss or injury.
There can be no recovery of exemplary damages in the
absence of a recovery of actual damages.
A verdict of nom75
inal actual damage is not sufficient.
The court then proceeded to decide that the facts of this case were
within the spectre of those situations where the plaintiff is entitled
to an award of punitive damages.
In this case actual damages are not recoverable because the
plaintiff in error carried workman's compensation insurance. However, we do not believe that the compensation
act changes the rule. We are of the opinion that in order to
recover exemplary damages the plaintiff must show himself entitled to recover actual damages, and which he would
recover but for the compensation act. Moreover, the rule
in this state is that the amount of exemplary damages allowed must be reasonably proportionate to the actual damages found. (citations omitted) It follows from the rules
stated above that in this case the jury should have been
asked whether or not the defendants in error sustained actual damages by reason
of the death of Russell, and, if so,
76
the amount thereof.
Thus, the court here has taken a rule requiring a recovery of
actual damages as a predicate to an award of punitive damages and
adjusted it so that the plaintiffs are allowed a recovery of punitive
damages even though the law specifically denies them a recovery of
actual damages. In addition, the court has placed a burden on the
defendant in error to litigate the question of actual damages; a task
which is ordinarily not performed where workman's compensation
exists. There is certainly merit in the result reached by the court,
however all of this contorting of the law would not be necessary if
the courts would take the realistic approach of allowing the plaintiff punitive damages if he is able to show a legal injury as a result
of defendant's malicious and culpable conduct. Surely this fact situation is not so far removed from the case where the plaintiff can
prove only nominal damages and thus is precluded from an award
of punitive damages regardless of the amount of maliciousness exhibited by the defendant.
sustained, but do not require that such damages be awarded.

See, e.g.,

Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 124 So. 2d 441 (1960); Hinton v. A.T. Sistare Constr. Co., 236 S.C. 125, 113 S.E.2d 341 (1960).
74. 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (1934).
75. Id. at 141, 70 S.W.2d 409.
76. Id.
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The majority view on the question of whether or not actual
damages need be proven or merely shown has been expressed by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hilbert v. Roth.77 The plaintiff
was injured in an automobile accident in which Roth, the driver of
the other vehicle, died. The plaintiff sued the estate of the driver of
the other vehicle, and also sued the driver of another vehicle with
whom the decedent was racing. Due to the difficulty of applying
the Dead Man's Rule to the case against Roth, the court withdrew a
juror and declared a mistrial as to Roth. Later requests by the
plaintiff to continue the action against Roth were denied by the
court. The plaintiff, however, attempted to proceed against Roth
for his punitive damages even though precluded on his claim for
compensatory damages. The court reiterated the Pennsylvania rule
"that no award for punitive damages may be made where actual
damage has not been suffered." 78 The court, although recognizing
that the plaintiff had suffered actual damage, noted that the plaintiff could not bring an action for these damages against Roth. It
then concluded by stating:
The right to punitive damages is a mere incident to a cause
of action-an element which the jury may consider in
making its determination-and not the subject of an action in itself. (citations omitted) Hence, since plaintiff
no longer has a course of action of which his claim for punitive damages may be an element, that claim must fail.79
It would seem that if Pennsylvania adhered strictly to the above
quoted passage, the plaintiffs in the Ft. Worth case might be able
to bring their action solely for the punitive damages. The two
cases could be distinguished on the basis that in Ft. Worth the plaintiffs did have a cause of action which was restricted by the requirements of the workmen's compensation law, while in Hilbert, the
plaintiff's cause of action was technically denied. In either case, the
courts have failed to provide for the punishment function of punitive damages. If the plaintiff has actually suffered damages and
through some technicality or slip of fate he should be denied his
cause of action, the defendant, however malicious and culpable be
his conduct, avoids all punishment.
The plaintiff's obvious frustration from being subjected to this
barrage of non sequitors and rationales of convenience is made evident by the application of the Pennsylvania rule in a libel case by
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania."° The
77.
78.
79.
80.

395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959).
Id. at 276, 149 A.2d at 652.
Id. at 276-77, 149 A.2d at 652.
Weider v. Hoffman, 238 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Pa. 1965).

plaintiff sued the defendant, charging that the defendant and his
publishing company had maliciously and libelously published certain statements in two issues of its magazine. The defendant denied the allegations and pleaded truth and other defenses. The defendant counterclaimed on numerous counts, most of which were
abandoned during the trial. The remaining counts involved conspiracy, which the defendant claimed were based on certain articles published in two magazines which the plaintiff published. The
jury found for the defendant on his counterclaim on the issue of
libel and awarded the defendant $30,000 punitive damages on his
conspiracy counterclaim against the plaintiff and his publishing
company. It should be noted that the jury awarded the defendant
no compensatory damages in his judgment against the plaintiff.
The jury was instructed that "punitive damages must bear a
reasonable relationship to compensatory damages, and not to
award damages for conduct which was not malicious, wanton,
reckless or oppressive."8 1 The defendant did not object to the instructions. Nevertheless, the jury awarded the $30,000 punitive
found that any compensatory damages
damages without having
2
were to be awarded.
On appeal the court considered the question of "whether under
Pennsylvania law there may be a recovery of punitive damages
The
when the jury found that there were no actual damages." '
court cited Hilbert v. Roth 4 for the proposition that no punitive
damages may be awarded without a finding of actual damages.8 5
The court, after distinguishing many cases cited in support of the
defendant's claim, and went on to state that "other principles point
to the conclusion that Pennsylvania law requires a finding and
award, as distinguished from a mere showing of actual damages to
'8 6
support an award of punitive damages.
The court then concluded that "[i]n the absence of a finding
and award of actual damages, there is no basis by which the reasonableness of a punitive award can be measured."87 The court conceded that a right of the defendant had been invaded, but held that
since no compensatory damages had been proven, the defendant's
recovery was "limited to a vindication by way of an award of nominal damages." The defendant's judgment was thus modified to
$1.00 nominal damages.8 8 Because the defendant's business increased after the plaintiff's alleged misconduct, the defendant was
unable to prove any actual damages sustained.8 9 Thus, the plaintiff,
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
395
238
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 444.
at 446.
at 444.
Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959).
F. Supp. 437, 445 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
at 446.
at 446.
at 447.
at 446.
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despite his maliciousness, was allowed to benefit from the defendant's good reputation and avoid liability for punitive damages.
There is a great range of opinion on the question considered.9 0
Many courts have followed the Hilbert decision and have held that
a claim for exemplary damages by itself will not be sufficient and
that the plaintiff must show actual injuries which would justify an
award of actual damages as a predicate to an award of punitive
damages. 91 Other courts, however, allow punitive damages although no actual damages have been awarded, as long as the
plaintiff has received injuries entitling him to compensation.9 2 Most
of these cases involve fact situations where the damages are unascertainable and the jury has awarded nominal damages in recognition of the violation of a legal right.9 3 There are also courts
which have not only required a finding of actual damages, but also
an award of such damages as a pre-condition for the award of punitive damages."
There are many other court holdings on this question, but because they are based more on technicalities than on concise rules of
law, it would be too difficult to categorize them. 5 In addition, as
evidenced by the Ft. Worth and Hilbert cases, there is little sense
in classifying any of the courts' positions on the question of actual
damages as a predicate to punitive damages, since by a narrower or
broader interpretation of the prior rule of law, a result can be
reached which may be completely without precedent in the particular jurisdiction.
It is submitted that the sounder view on the question of
whether or not actual damages need be a predicate for an award of
punitive damages is that which requires merely evidence of malicious conduct on the part of the defendant and a corresponding
legal injury to the plaintiff no matter how nominal. Those courts
which require proof of substantial actual damages or anything in
excess of nominal damages are ignoring any punitive or deterrent
benefit to be derived from a punitive damages award. As long as
90.

See cases cited note 73 and accompanying text supra.

91.

Id.

92. Id.
93. Id. See also Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196 (2d Cir.
1896); Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Guthridge v.
Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709 (Del. 1967); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Ritchel,
148 Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912); State v. Shain, 341 Mo. 733, 108 S.W.2d
351 (1937); Ferguson v. Evening Chronicle Publishing Co., 72 Mo. App.
462 (1897); Maring-Crawford Motor Co. v. Smith, 285 Ala. 477, 233 So. 2d
484 (1970). Contra,Ennis v. Brawley, 129 W. Va. 621, 41 S.E.2d 680 (1947).
94. See cases cited note 73 and accompanying text supra.
95. See generally Annot. 17 A.L.R.2d 527 (1951); 22 Am. Jun. 2d,
Damages §§ 263-266 (1965); 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 117-118 (1966).

the courts adhere to the principle that an award of punitive damages is in no way to serve as compensation to the plaintiff, then the
plaintiff's ability or inability to show ascertainable actual damages
should be irrelevant. As one court has suggested, perhaps the punitive damages should be paid to the state since it is the public policy
of the state in the first place which dictates the awarding of punitive damages as an expression "of the community attitude towards
one who willfully and wantonly causes hurt or injury to another." 96
III.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO ACTUAL DAMAGES

Further compounding the problems of a plaintiff seeking an
award of punitive damages are the courts which reinforce the substantial actual damages requirement with the qualification that the
amount of punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to
the award of compensatory damages.
If it be conceded, which it must be, that the rule forbidding
exemplary damages except in those cases where actual
damages are shown is a sound one, it follows then that the
amount or extent of such actual damages should in a measure determine the amount to be awarded as exemplary
damages. And, while they should be large enough to command respect for the law and to deter others from similar
97
infractions, they should not be excessive or oppressive.
The courts seem to decide their intended policy with respect to
punitive damages, then compound what appears to be the fallacious
reasoning of the substantial damages concept by requiring a reason98
able relationship between actual and punitive damages.
While most courts allow the trier of facts a certain amount of
discretion in ascertaining the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded, 99 this freedom is actually somewhat restricted. The
96. Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
97. Flanary v. Wood, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 250, 73 S.W. 1072 (1903).
See cases cited notes 102-05 and accompanying text infra.
98. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173
(1931). The reason why the rationale behind the application of a reasonable relationship test seems without merit is that the courts in applying
the test appear to establish new standards whenever it seems convenient.
It is conceded that the facts of each case may be so different as to require
a subjective determination of punitive damages for each particular decision, but if that be the case, the courts are not applying a true reasonable
relationship test. On the contrary, they are considering the facts of each
case on their merits and are thus adopting an approach similar to that
utilized in Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. App. 1964) in which
the court held:
Because of the variegated nature and number of the factors
that may be taken in account, there is no precise rule that can be
applied with mathematical nicety to determine the amount of
punitive damages. Each case must turn on its own peculiar facts.
Id. at 693-94. See also note 19 and accompanying text supra.
99. See Glass v. Gamble-Skogmo. Inc., 357 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1966)
(applying Illinois law); Barnett v. Love, 294 F.2d 585 (4th Cir. 1961) (applying South Carolina law); Garland Coal & Mining Co. v. Few, 267 F.2d
785 (10th Cir. 1959); Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
Pinckard v. Dunnavant, 281 Ala. 533, 206 So. 2d 340 (1968); Ferraro v.

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

courts, regardless of which test is applied in determining the excessiveness of the punitive damages award, will not allow an award
to stand which is so excessive that it is evidence of passion or prejudice or a general misconception of the proper rules of law to be applied. 100 However, although the courts appear to be unanimous in
this respect, 0 1 this unity of thought quickly disintegrates under the
strain of the various tests which are formulated to test the excessiveness of such punitive damages awards.
The safeguard imposed upon the trier of facts' discretion would
normally be satisfactory were it not for the courts' method of utilizing the safeguard. Instead of considering the evidence and then deciding whether a rational person could assess a similar amount of
punitive damages based on the same set of facts or circumstances,
the courts either state that the damages are excessive because they
do not bear a reasonable relationship to the award of compensatory
damages awarded' 02 or that it is the policy of the particular jurisdiction to limit the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages to a certain figure.10 Nowhere in the court enunciated policy
Pacific Ins. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 354, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1970); Richard v.
Hunter, 151 Ohio St. 185, 85 N.E.2d 109 (1949); Rooks v. Brunch, 202 Kan.
441, 449 P.2d 580 (1969); Henderson v. Henderson Funeral Home Corp.,
320 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1958); Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d 685 (Mo.
App. 1964); Montoya v. Moore, 77 N.M. 326, 422 P.2d 363 (1967); Baumgartner's Electric Constr. Co. v. DeVries, 77 S.D. 273, 91 N.W.2d 663
(1958); Tynberg v. Cohen, 76 Tex. 416, 13 S.W. 315 (1890); Osterag v.
LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 1022 (1959); Raines v. Faulkner, 131 W.
Va. 10, 48 S.E.2d 393 (1947).
100. See also Wegner v. R~deo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D.
Colo. 1968); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969);
Richard v. Hunter, 151 Ohio St. 185, 85 N.E.2d 109 (1949).
101. See cases cited note 99 supra. While the courts state that they
will overturn an award of punitive damages which is so large as to evidence an abuse of discretion by the trier of fact, too often the courts in
reviewing the awards attempt to apply an exact mathematical ratio and
thus any amount of punitive damages which exceeds this ratio will be
conclusively excessive.
The court in Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W. 18 (1914) attacked this practice because it was of the opinion that, in most cases, the
jury did act properly and conduct itself in the manner prescribed by the
court for the exercise of its discretion. Therefore, the Luther court reasoned, why should they be charged "with bias or perversity because the
measure of their abhorrence of defendant's conduct and their judgment of
what would be a sufficient punishment and deterrent was represented by a
larger sum of money than that which some other man or men would have
allowed." Id. at 237, 147 N.W. at 19.
102. Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo.
1968); Nielson v. Flashberg, 101 Ariz. 335, 419 P.2d 514 (1966); Ferraro v.
Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 354, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1970); Boise Dodge,
Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969); Spencer v. Steinbrecher,
152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968).
103. See Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo.
1968); Montgomery v. Tufford, 165 Colo. 18, 437 P.2d 36 (1968); Montoya

of restricting the trier of facts' discretion is there any indication
that this was the intended approach to be utilized. This is not to
say that a test or other formula to determine the excessiveness of
the award could not be formulated. However, since the excessiveness of the punitive damages award must evidence passion or prejudice or a general misapprehension of the proper rules of law
to be applied, 0 4 any test must include those elements which would
necessarily affect any or all of these three areas. Merely holding
that the award was excessive because the punitive damages
awarded were large as compared with a court made rule of thumb,
does not reveal the manner in which the trier of facts has abused
its privilege.
The concept which is closest to a strict test is that advanced by
those courts which require a relationship of some form between
punitive damages and actual damages. 10 5 Although most of these
courts aver that there is no fixed ratio or mathematical relationship,106 their actual methods of calculating a proper or reasonable
relationship indicate otherwise. The courts may look to prior cases,
in their own 07 and other jurisdictions, 10 8 and if they find a fact
v. Moore, 77 N.M. 326, 422 P.2d 363 (1961); Mitchell v. Randal, 288 Pa. 518,
137 A. 171 (1927); Rider v. York Haven W. & P. Co., 251 Pa. 18, 95 A. 803
(1915); Suzore v. Rutherford, 35 Tenn. App. 678, 251 S.W.2d 129 (1952);
Lubbock Bail Bond v. Joshua, 416 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
Contra, Stevenson v. Hearst Consol. Publications, 214 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.
1954); Cromwell-Collier Publishing Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.
1948); Foster v. Floyd, 276 Ala. 428, 163 So. 2d 213 (1964); Ferraro v.
Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 354, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1970); Boise Dodge,
Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969); Rooks v. Brunch, 202
Kan. 441, 449 P.2d 580 (1969); Wills v. Hughes, 172 Kan. 45, 238 P.2d 478
(1951); Faubion v. Tucker, 58 N.M. 303, 270 P.2d 713 (1954); Dial Finance
& Thrift Co. v. Dennis, 403 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Osterag v.
LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 1022 (1959).
104. See cases cited note 100 and accompanying text supra.
105. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
106. See Flame Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 303 F.2d
39 (6th Cir. 1962); Collins v. Finch, 311 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. M.D.
1969); Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo. 1968);
Hecht v. Smith, 183 Cal. App. 2d 723, 7 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1960); Montgomery
v. Tufford, 165 Colo. 18, 437 P.2d 36 (1968); Reynolds v. Willis, 209 A.2d
760 (Del. 1965); Hunter v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 213 Mo. App. 233, 248
S.W. 998 (1923); Montoya v. Moore, 77 N.M. 326, 422 P.2d 363 (1967);
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Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1948) (applying Florida law); Foster v.
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8 Cal. App. 3d 354, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1970); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark,
92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969); Rooks v. Brunch, 202 Kan. 441, 449
P.2d 580 (1969); Faubion v. Tucker, 58 N.M. 303, 270 P.2d 713 (1954); Dial
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108. See Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo.
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416 S.W.2d.523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

situation which is similar to the case under review, they may apply
the same ratio as in the prior case.109 This approach not only ignores the need to consider each case on its own facts, but it also
presumes that the prior case referred to was based upon a sound
exercise of discretion by the trier of facts. Thus, any differences in
surrounding circumstances are not considered. 110 The jury which
originally was impressed with unhampered discretion to fix damages is now confined to a ratio established in a case decided twenty
or thirty years before the one under consideration.
An example of this approach is Lubbock Bail Bond v. Joshua,-1
where the plaintiff received a judgment consisting of punitive and
actual damages. In a suit brought for assault and false imprisonment, the court stated that the ratio or proportion of punitive damages to the amount of actual damages awarded must depend on
the state of facts of any given case. 12 One of the decisions cited
for this proposition was Cotton v. Cooper,"3 a case involving usury
which had been decided forty-eight years earlier. The Lubbock
court then referred to the Cooper decision and held that since the
"aggravations and oppressions in the present case were as great or
greater than"'1 4 in Cooper, the Lubbock court would follow the
specific proportion adopted in that case. The Cooper court had
stated that it had established the relationship of actual damages and
punitive damages which it had utilized because of the circumstances
"[iln view of the peculiar and exceptional facts of the case."115
Nevertheless, the Lubbock court used that ratio in a case which
involved a different cause of action and which contained an entirely
dissimilar state of facts. To retard the use of discretion by a jury
through a "test" such as that employed by the Lubbock court is to
relieve the jury of all discretion.
Other courts place different restrictions on the relationship either by limiting the award of punitive damages to the amount of
actual damages awarded, or by referring to past cases in their jurisdiction and limiting the ratio to the amount previously awarded in
109. See Collins v. Brown, 268 F. Supp. 198 (D.C.D.C. 1967); Montgomery v. Tufford, 165 Colo. 18, 437 P.2d 36 (1968); Rider v. York Haven
W. & P. Co., 251 Pa. 18, 95 A. 803 (1915); Suzore v. Rutherford, 251 S.W.2d
129, 35 Tenn. App. 678 (1952).
110. See, e.g., Lubbock Bail Bond v. Joshua, 416 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967). See also Montgomery v. Tufford, 165 Colo. 18, 437 P.2d 36
(1968).
111. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1173 (1931). See also Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369

(D. Colo. 1968).
112. 416 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
113. Id. at 530.
114. 209 S.W. 135.
115. 416 S.W.2d 523, 530.

prior cases, without making any attempt to compare the facts involved in the prior cases with those of the one under consideration.1 16 The courts of Colorado,"' for example, seem to require that
the proportion of punitive damages to actual damages must be substantially equal, although stating that no fixed or definite ratio
exists. Pennsylvania,' 18 on the other hand, has expressed the opinion that since the Pennsylvania courts have never allowed a judgment of punitive damages which is three times the amount of actual damages awarded, this is evidence of a proper relationship between the two forms of damages. 119 Both of these tests also place
an arbitrary limit on the amount of punitive damages that a jury
may give. This limit, once again, seems unrelated to any question
of passion or prejudice or misapprehension of the law.
CONCLUSION

The problem is not that the courts feel punitive damages have
no place in an award of damages in tort. On the contrary, the
courts are quite unanimous in holding that punitive damages are
properly includable in awards under certain circumstances. The
crucial question, however, is to determine in which situations the
courts have indicated that awards of punitive damages are warranted, and in what amount.
There is nothing legally improper in the awarding of punitive
damages for the purpose of achieving goals other than those of
punishment or deterrence. As has been previously mentioned, it is
quite possible that punitive damages are awarded as an inducement
to sue. However, if that is the case, it is merely a more indirect
way of accomplishing the punishment function of punitive damages. Regardless of whether the courts have discarded the traditional functions of punitive damages and replaced them with their
own, the time has come for a candid re-evaluation of the philosophy
behind punitive damages.
116. 209 S.W. 138.
117. See, e.g., Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D.
Colo. 1968); Muller v. Reagh, 150 Cal. App. 2d 99, 309 P.2d 826 (1957);
Montgomery v. Tufford, 165 Colo. 18, 437 P.2d 36 (1968); Mitchell v. Randal, 288 Pa. 518, 137 A. 171 (1927); Rider v. York Haven W. & P. Co., 251
Pa. 18, 95 A. 803 (1915); Suzore v. Rutherford, 35 Tenn. App. 678, 251
S.W.2d 129 (1952); Morgan v. Arnold, 441 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969);
Lubbock Bail Bond v. Joshua, 416 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). But
see, State v. Shain, 341 Mo. 733, 108 S.W.2d 351 (1937) (Punitive damages
of $4,000.00 and actual damages of $1.00); Basden v. Mills, 472 P.2d 889
(Okla. 1970) (ratio of punitive damages to actual damages was 21-1);
Malco Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wisc. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d
516 (1961).
118. See Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Assoc., 290 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo.
1968). See also Hanlon, Exemplary Damages-In Colorado-Punitive or
Puny? 35 COLO. L. REv. 394 (1962-63).
119. See Mitchell v. Randal, 288 Pa. 518, 137 A. 171 (1927); Rider v.
York Haven W. & P. Co., 251 Pa. 18, 95 A. 803 (1915). See also Weider v
Hoffman, 238 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Pa. 1965); Hughes v. Babcock, 349 Pa. 475,
37 A.2d 551 (1944).
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If the courts are of the opinion that punishment and deterrence
should be left to the criminal law, then perhaps punitive damages
should be considered as something in the nature of damages for pain
and suffering or mental distress. However, even utilizing this approach, there is still some question as to the legitimacy of a ratio
or reasonable relation test. In addition there may be offenses under the civil law which have no corresponding criminal sanction. In
those circumstances the civil law must provide for the punishment
function.
A test or ratio such as those mentioned above must rely on a
presumption that the amount of actionable, provable injury is in direct correlation with the degree of malicious or wanton behavior
exhibited by the defendant. While that presumption may be valid
in certain situations, it has no place in areas of the law such as
defamation. A defendant may entertain the most malicious
thoughts and intentions while defaming the plaintiff, yet, if the
plaintiff has a sound reputation, there is a great possibility that he
will suffer little or no observable injury.
The courts which apply a test or ratio claim that these are necessary to facilitate appellate review of jury awards. A test such as
the necessity for a reasonable relationship between actual damages
and punitive damages enables the court to temper the amount of
punitive damages awarded, yet insure that justice is served. This
approach, however, is not the most practical one available. It is
submitted that the approach which would be most practical, and yet
achieve the best results in terms of punishment and deterrence, is
that which considers each case on its own particular facts. This
would take into consideration the wealth of the parties, their relationship with each other, the defendant's mens rea, as well as the
subsequent effect of the defendant's conduct on the physical, mental and economic well being of the plaintiff.
The court, in reviewing the trial record of each case, should determine whether the facts as presented warranted an award of
punitive damages in the amount established by the trier of facts.
The presence or absence of substantial compensatory damages
should not dictate the amount of punitive damages. As long as the
trier of facts has found for the plaintiff, it has been proven that the
defendant did act in some manner which was contrary to the law.
If the punitive and deterrent functions of punitive damages are to
be served, their award must be governed by the character of the culpable actions of the defendant rather than the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff.
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